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Regulation  No.  864/2007  on  the  law  applicable  to  non-contractual  obligations  
(Rome II) establishes the regime that governs the applicable law concerning torts  
situations involving a conflict of laws. The Rome II Regulation doesn’t have a spe-
cific rule regarding the Internet, however, many different types of torts occur on-
line, and an effort to adapt the Rome II Regulation rules is crucial, due to the spe -
cific features of the Internet. This study addresses the adaptation of Article 4 (gen-
eral rule applicable in the absence of a choice-of-law agreement), so it can be applied  
to Internet torts, especially Section 1 that determines the application of the law of  
the place of the damage. The main problem that arises from this rule is the concept  
of damage, specifically where the Internet is concerned: the concept of damage on-
line; how can damage online be located; how can we solve those situations where it  
is difficult to locate the damage or the damage is spread across several countries.
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1. REGULATION NO 864/2007 OF THE LAW APPLICABLE TO 
NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (ROME II)
Regulation No 864/2007 of the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
(Rome II) establishes the regime that  governs the applicable law to torts 
situations involving a conflict of laws. The Rome II Regulation defines its 
material scope in Article 1, stating that it applies to non-contractual obliga-
tions in civil and commercial matters involving a conflict of laws. From its 
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scope area are excluded the revenue, customs or administrative matters or 
the liability of the State for acts or omissions in the exercise of State author-
ity. Apart from these matters, Article 1, Section 2 and 3, filters further the 
scope  of  Rome II,  excluding  certain  non-contractual  obligations  from its 
range. The spatial scope of Rome II is defined by Article 3 which determines 
that the Regulation's scope is universal: Rome II will be applied even if the 
law designated is that of a non-Member State. Therefore, Rome II does not 
distinguish  between  cases  involving  Member  States  and cases  involving 
third countries. As to its temporal scope, Article 32 clarifies that the regula-
tion applies to all events that have given rise to any damage taken place 
after 11 January 20091.
Rome II Regulation doesn’t have a specific rule which applies to the In-
ternet, however, many different types of torts occur online, and an effort to 
adapt the Rome II Regulation rules is indispensable, due to the specific fea-
tures of the Internet2. Apart from the cases of infringement of intellectual 
property rights, product liability, unfair competition and acts restricting free 
competition, for which there are special rules, Rome II has general rules for 
the types of torts that do not fall in that category: Article 14 (freedom of 
choice) and Article 4 (general rule applicable in the absence of a choice-of-
law agreement). These would be, for example, situations where the Internet 
is used as a way to share malicious data and spread damages, like worms, 
virus and malicious programs that can destroy restricted networks or per-
sonal computers, or is used either to steal information or spread false in-
formation.
The application of Article 4 raises several complex issues, especially in 
section 1. In those situations of a non-contractual obligation arising out of a 
tort, in which the tortfeasor and the victim don´t have their habitual resid-
ence in the same country (Article 4, Section 2), the applicable law is the law 
of the country in which the damage occurs. The main problem that arises 
from this rule is the concept of damage and, specifically where the Internet 
is concerned: the concept of damage online; how can damage online be loc-
ated; how can we solve those situations when it  is  difficult  to locate the 
damage or the damage is spread across several countries. These difficulties 
1 The ECJ clarified the doubts that were raised regarding the date of application of the Regu-
lation: 17.11.2011, Deo Antoine v. GMF Assurances SA, C-412/10, ECR I-11603.
2 As demonstrated by Gonçalves, A.S.S. 2013, ‘The application of the Rome II Regulation on 
the Internet Torts’, Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 7, no 1, pp. 35-47.
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in applying the general rule of the Rome II Regulation to Internet torts are 
the focus of this study.
2. THE APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL RULE OF ROME II 
REGULATION TO INTERNET TORTS
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF DAMAGE
Article 4, Section 1, determines the traditional connection of the lex loci de-
licti commissi, materialized by the connecting factor place of damage. Thus, 
it is applicable the law of the place of damage, regardless of the place where 
the event which gave rise to the damage occurred and of the place where 
the indirect consequences of the damage occurred. What we need to analyze 
first is the concept of damage. Article 4, Section 1, establishes the criteria of 
the direct or immediate damage: the first impact rule and the ECJ have clari-
fied the concept of direct damage and consequential damage for the pur-
pose of article  5,  Section 3, of the Brussels Convention3 and the Brussels 
Regulation. Between the Rome II Regulation4,5, the Rome I Regulation and 
the Brussels I Regulation there must be a natural articulation which was re-
cognized  by  the  European Commission  due  to  the  nature  of  the  issues 
which these instruments address and due to the common objectives that 
they share6: as part of the EU policy of judicial cooperation in civil and com-
mercial matters. This is also acknowledged in Recital 7 of the Rome II and 
the Rome I Regulation and by the ECJ7, and justifies a cautious use of the 
abundant jurisprudence about the Brussels I Regulation in the interpreta-
tion of Rome II.
3 27th September 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters.
4 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
5 Note that in the explanatory memorandum of Rome II Regulation proposal, the European 
Commission refers to the jurisprudence of the ECJ to define this criterion: European Com-
mission 2003, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“ROME II”), COM 427 final, Brussels, p. 
11.
6 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council, Cit., p. 2.
7 This question was put before the ECJ concerning the interpretation of Article 6 of Rome 
Convention:  ECJ 2010,  «Request  for preliminary ruling from the Cour d'  appel (Luxem-
bourg) on January 18, 2010 - Heiko Koelzsch / Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (C-29/10 )», OJ 
C 80. The General Advocate, invoking literal, systematic and teleological arguments, pro-
nounced in this sense, although noting that the use, in general,  of the existing case law 
about international jurisdiction to the interpretation of conflict-of-law rules should be made 
on a case by case. V. ECJ, Heiko Koelzsch v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, C-29/10, Opinion 
of  General  Advocate  Verica  Trstenjak,  submitted  on  16  December  2010,  in  http://curi-
a.europa.eu/jurisp acessed in 05.01.2011
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The place of occurrence of the direct damage, in the sense of the ECJ´s 
jurisprudence, will therefore be the place where the direct results from the 
event, that generates the situation of liability, are produced8. Recital 17 of 
Rome  II  reinforces  the  irrelevance  of  the  place  where  the  indirect  con-
sequences of the fact occurred, by clearly stating that «[the applicable law 
should be determined on the basis of where the damage occurred, regard-
less of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences could oc-
cur». Recital 17 also explains that «( ... ) in cases of personal injury or dam-
ages to property, the country in which the damage occurs should be the 
country where the injury was sustained or the property was damaged re-
spectively». This supports the idea that the significant damage is the direct 
damage. To determine the applicable law is relevant the place where the 
right was injured - where the damage, which results from a causal event, 
materializes.  This  does not  take into account the place where the victim 
suffered the financial damage subsequent upon the initial damage arising 
and suffered by him in other State9.
2.2 THE LOCATION OF THE ONLINE DELICT
The localization of the online delict is not an easy task, as can be concluded 
by the analysis of the ECJ jurisprudence. Article 5, Section 3, of the Brussels 
Regulation establishes an alternative jurisdiction in relation to torts/delicts 
in favour of the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or 
may occur10. Called to interpret the concept of place where the harmful event  
occurred or may occur, the ECJ has decided that the plaintiff has the option to 
sue, either in the courts of the place of the event which gives rise to and is at 
the origin of that damage, either in the courts of the place where the dam-
8 1995, Antonio Marinari v. Loyd´s Bank and Zubaidi Trading Company, C-364/93, ECR I-
2719; 1990, Dumez France SA and Tracoba SARL v. Hessische Landesbank and others, C-
220/88, ECR I-49; 2004, Rudolf Kronhofer v. Marianne Maier and others», C-168/02, ECR I-
6009; 1998, Réunion européenne SA and o. v. Spliethoff´s Bevrachtingskantoor BV and the 
Master of the vessel “Alblasgracht”, C-51/97, ECR I-6511; 2004, Danmarks Rederiforening, 
acting on behalf of DFDS Torline A/S v. LO Landsorganisationen i Sverige, acting on behalf  
of SEKO Sjöfolk Facket for Service och Kommunikation, C-18/02, ECR I-1417; 2009, Zuid-
Chemie BV v. Philippo´s Moneralenfabriek NV/SA, C-189/08, ECR I-06917.
9 European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil, Cit., p. 11. So, according to the example of the European Commission, in a traffic acci-
dent «(…) the place of the direct damage is the place where the collision occurs, irrespective  
of financial or non-material damage sustained in another country (…)»: idem, ibidem.
10 This is an alternative jurisdiction which means that the claimant may choose to bring action 
before the courts of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled (Article 2) or before 
the courts designated by Article 5, Section 3.
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age occurred11. According to the ECJ, the relevant damage is only the direct 
damage12 as the place where the direct results of the wrongful act or omis-
sion occurred. However, the court of the place of the wrongful action has 
jurisdiction to decide  upon the  compensation  of  all  the  damages,  which 
have resulted from that behavior, whereas the court of the place of the dam-
age has only jurisdiction to decide about the damages that occur in its territ-
ory13.
2.2.1. THE EDATE CASE
In the eDate case, the ECJ addressed a situation of online infringement of 
personality rights and recognized the specificity of the ubiquitous nature of 
the Internet and its worldwide reach. The ECJ pondered in this case the im-
pact in an individual’s personality rights of a content that was shared online 
on a website and the high extent of the damages that it can cause, while 
keeping the interpretation of Article 5, Section 3: the claimant can bring an 
action against all the damages caused in the court of the place of the event 
(in this case, the place of the establishment of the publisher of the content) 
or the courts of each Member State where the damage occurred (in this case,  
each Member State in the territory of which the content placed online is or 
has been made accessible)14. However, the ECJ adapted the interpretation of 
the rule to the nature of the Internet, noting that a content that is placed on-
line can be accessed all over the world, which increases the impact of the 
damage,  and that  «(…) it  is  not  always possible,  on a technical  level,  to 
quantify that distribution with certainty and accuracy in relation to a partic-
ular Member State or,  therefore, to assess the damage caused exclusively 
within that Member State»15. Consequently the ECJ considered that another 
court should have jurisdiction to decide upon the compensation of all the 
damages caused: the court of the place where the victim has his center of in-
11 See, e.g., 1976, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier B.V. v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A., 21/76, ECR 
1735. According to the ECJ, the jurisprudence of the court about the provisions of the Brus-
sels  Convention should apply to the  equivalent  rules of  Brussels  I  Regulation:  see,  e.g., 
Zuid-Chemie,  Cit.;  2002,  Verein  für  Konsumenteninformation  v  Karl  Heinz  Henkel,  C-
167/00, ECR I-08111; 2004, Rudolf Kronhofer v Marianne Maier and Others, C-168/02, ECR I-
06009.
12 Zuid-Chemie, Cit.;  Rudolf Kronhofer, Cit.;  1990, Dumez France SA and Tracoba SARL v 
Hessische Landesbank and others, C-220/88, ECR I-00049.
13 ECJ 1995, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint Interna-
tional Ltd v Presse Alliance SA, C-68/93, ECR I-415.
14 2011, eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez v 
MGN Limited (C-161/10), C-509/09 and C-161/10, ECR I-10269.
15 Idem, ibidem.
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terests16. The center of interests of the victim would generally be his habitu-
al residence, but the ECJ admitted that it could also be the place where the 
victim follows his professional activity if the person has a close connection 
with that State17. The jurisdiction of the court of the place of the victim´s 
center of interests is justified by the ECJ according to the principle of pre-
dictability underlying the rules of jurisdiction: in this case, the publisher of 
the harmful content is in a position to know where the center of interests of  
the person, which will suffer the damage, is.
2.2.2. THE WINTERSTEIGER CASE
In the Wintersteiger case18, it was also at issue an online delict, but in a situ-
ation of infringement of an intellectual property right. When called to de-
termine the place where the harmful event occurred, the ECJ did not use the 
criteria of the center of interests, considering that factor only relevant in the 
specific context of infringement of personality rights: this factor was justi-
fied by the objective of foreseeability of jurisdiction19 and because the per-
sonality rights are protected in all Member States, while «(…) the protection 
afforded by the registration of a national trade mark is, in principle, limited 
to the territory of the Member State in which the trade mark is registered , 
so that, in general, its proprietor cannot rely on that protection outside the 
territory»20. The justification of the application of the center of interest in 
cases of infringement of personality rights and exclusion of the same factor 
in the case of infringement of a national trade mark is the foreseeability of 
jurisdiction according to the geographic range of protection of each right, 
which allows the claimant and defendant to foresee where one can sue and 
the other can be sued, respectively.
As to determine the place where the damage occurred, the court decided 
that «(…) both the objective of foreseeability and that of sound administra-
tion of justice militate in favor of conferring jurisdiction, in respect of the 
damage occurred, in the courts of the Member State in which the right at is-
sue is protected»21: those courts could determine all the damages, because 
16 Idem, ibidem.
17 Idem, ibidem.
18 2012, Wintersteiger AG vs. Producuts 4USondermaschinenbau GmbH, C-523/10, ECR 2012, 
p. 0000.
19 Allowing the claimant to easily identify in which court he can sue and the defendant to 
reasonably to foresee in which court he can be sued: idem, ibidem, § 22-24.
20 Idem, ibidem, § 25.
21 Idem, ibidem, § 27.
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all  the  damages  against  the  protected  right  would  occur  in  the  country 
where the right was protected by registration. This case involved a trade 
mark registered in a Member State, and the ECJ decided that the plaintiff 
could sue in the courts of the Member State in which the trade mark was re-
gistered.
In the  same case-law,  the  ECJ also  addressed the concept  of  place  of 
event giving rise to the infringement of an intellectual property right and 
specifically to a trade mark. According to ECJ, «an action relating to alleged 
infringement of a trade mark registered in a Member State through the use, 
by an advertiser, of a keyword identical to that trade mark on a search en-
gine website operating under a country-specific top-level domain of another 
Member State may also be brought before the courts of the Member State of 
the place of establishment of the advertiser»22. Therefore, the place of the es-
tablishment of the infringer is  important,  as also is  where he decided to 
practice the acts, which gave rise to the damage. The ECJ concluded that the 
act,  which  gave rise  to  the  damage (the  technical  display  process),  took 
place on a server belonging to the operator of the search engine that the in-
fringer chose to use23. Nevertheless, apart from the uncertainty of the place 
of establishment of that server, which would be unpredictable24, its location 
has little connection with the causal event, which gave rise to the damage. 
The place of the decision of the act was considered by the ECJ as a definite 
and an identifiable  place,  which  could  also  facilitate  the  presentation  of 
evidence and the organization of the process25. Here the criterion was also 
the foreseeability of the forum, according to the principle of proximity.  
2.2.3. THE PETER PINCKNEY CASE
In the Peter Pinckney case26 there was an infringement of copyrights com-
mitted by means of a content placed online on a website. The author of a  
music work, domiciled in France, claimed damages in the French courts, 
22 §38. Note that for ECJ the infringer is «(…) the advertiser choosing a keyword identical to  
the trade mark, and not the provider of the referencing service, who uses it in the course of 
trade (…). The event giving rise to a possible infringement of trade mark law therefore lies 
in the actions of the advertiser using the referencing service for its own commercial commu-
nications».
23 Also in the 2012, Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Sportradar GmbH et Sportradar AG, C-
173/11, ECR 00000, the ECJ stated the irrelevance of the territory of the State where is situ-
ated the web server from which the data in question is sent.
24 Wintersteiger AG, Cit., § 36.
25 Idem, ibidem, § 37.
26 2013, Peter Pinckney vs KDG Mediatech AG, C-170/12, ECR 00000.
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against  a  company  established  in  Austria,  which  reproduced  the  work 
there, on a material support that was afterwards marketed, through the in-
ternet, by companies (working in the United Kingdom), using a website that 
was made accessible in France (place of the court seized). So, in this case, it  
was necessary to locate the place of the damage to determine if the French 
courts had jurisdiction.
Following, what we call the delict analysis approach, the ECJ analysed 
the infringed right and noted that copyrights are subject to the principle of 
territoriality, but they are protected in all Member States, especially because 
of the Directive 2001/29, thus «(…) they may be infringed in each one in ac-
cordance with the applicable substantive law»27. As a consequence, the ECJ 
concluded, that the damage may occur in the jurisdiction of the court that 
was seized because the copyrights were protected in that territory, and the 
risk of infringement arises «(…) from the possibility of obtaining a repro-
duction of the work to which the rights relied on by the defendant pertain 
from an internet site accessible within the jurisdiction of the court seized 
(…)28. In this case, the seized court could only know that the damage oc-
curred in its territory.
3. LESSONS WITHDRAWN FROM THE ECJ JURISPRUDENCE 
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF ROME II TO ONLINE 
TORTS
It´s time to ascertain if it´s possible to get any lessons from the ECJ jurispru-
dence to the application of Article 4 to Internet torts. The first lesson, is the 
concept of direct damage used in Article 4, Section 1, of the Rome II Regula-
tion as the place where the first impact damage (direct damage) as a result 
of  the  harmful  event  was  produced:  place  where  the  right  was  injured; 
where the damage that results from the causal event materializes. So, in the 
case of a virus, malicious program that attacks a specific computer or net-
work, or hacker that steals information stored in a certain computer or net-
work, the place of the significant damage will be the one where the com-
puter is located or network affected by the virus, malicious program or the 
theft. However, situations of infringements of rights through the Internet, 
by the diffuse nature of the World Wide Web, may produce effects in nu-
merous places.
27 Idem, ibidem, § 39.
28 Idem, ibidem, § 44.
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The place where the damage occurred may be different according to the 
nature of the infringed right29 (as decided in Wintersteiger and Peter Pinck-
ney cases). So, the determination of the place of damage may require a de-
lict analysis approach, as the ECJ has already done to the infringement of 
personality rights, trademarks and copyrights. In this analysis, it must be 
taken into account that the occurrence of damage in a place is subject to the 
condition, that the right in respect of which such alleged infringement is 
protected by that  State  (as  decided in  Wintersteiger  and Peter  Pinckney 
cases)30.
The second lesson refers to damages spread across several countries. In 
the case of scattered torts (‘Streudelikt’) in which one wrongful action may 
give rise to damages located in several States, i.e., on computers or networks 
placed on different countries, according to the mosaic approach (‘Mosaikbe-
trachtung’) to each damage it will be applicable a different law. Something 
similar was decided in Shevill, a case involving the infringement of person-
ality rights, namely a situation of libel by a newspaper article distributed in 
several Member States31 (confirmed on eDate). The place of the event which 
gave rise to the damage was considered to be the place where the publisher 
of the newspaper was established, because it was in that place where the 
harmful event was originated and «(…) from which the libel was issued and 
put into circulation»32. The place of the damage (that would only have juris-
diction to award the damages produced in its own territory) was the place 
where the harmful effects upon the victim were produced, which was, in 
that case, the Member States «(…) in which the defamatory publication was 
distributed and in which the victim claims to have suffered injury to his 
reputation (…)»33.
As a consequence,  there  could be  situations where  the same harmful 
event generates damages in two countries, A and B, and the damages are 
compensated only in country A and not in B, by the application to each one 
of the damages of the law of the place where the damage occurred. This is 
the result of the natural differences existing between substantive laws, but 
harms the coherence in the regulation of unitary situations by their frag-
29 Wintersteiger, Cit., §21 to 24; Peter Pinckney, Cit., §32, §36 to §39.
30 Wintersteiger, Cit., §25; Peter Pinckney, Cit., §33, § 43.
31 Fiona Shevill, Cit.
32 Idem, ibidem.
33 Idem, ibidem. In this situation, the plaintiff should take action before the courts of each Mem-
ber State in which territory the damage occurred (Mosaikbetrachtung).
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mentation,  and reduces legal  certainty34.  The escape clause of manifestly 
closer connection to Article 4, Section 3, is not the solution for this problem. 
The escape clause is a technique to get the application of the law that has 
the closest connection with the case and is an expression of the principle of 
proximity35. This is a figure of exceptional intervention, which aims to cor-
rect the result of location done by the conflict-of-law rule and is closely re-
lated to the idea of the center of gravity of the legal relationship. It does not 
intervene by substantive reasons - to correct the material result of applying 
the laws indicated by the conflict-of-law rule36, but by conflictual reasons - it 
allows the application of a law that has a closer connection with the situ-
ation, than the one indicated by the conflict-of-law rules, according to the 
principle of proximity.
Another problem, which arises from the diffuse and global nature of the 
Internet, is the difficulty in locating the damage and here the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ may also be of some help. It may not be easy to identify the place 
of the direct damage and therefore the problem is how to determine the ap-
plicable law according to the Rome II Regulation in such cases. For instance, 
situations where some virus affects computers all over the world by a virus 
introduced on an Internet service provider. How to determine the place of 
damage in those complex cases, which encompass several events, and the 
assessment of damages is complex because they are spread across several 
States,  being therefore difficult to separate them in order to know which 
damage occurred in which country.
Article 4, Section 3 of Rome II, introduces a certain flexibility in the gen-
eral conflict rule allowing the judge to correct the rigidity of the rules con-
tained in Sections 2 and 1, according to the circumstances of the case. Ac-
cording to Section 3 of Article 4, the applicable law may be another that has 
a closer connection than the one prescribed by the connecting factors estab-
lished by the rule. This implies a comparison between the law of the dam-
34 About Gonçalves, A.S.S. 2013, Da Responsabilidade Extracontratual, Cit., pp. 135-158.
35 About the escape clause, Gonçalves, A.S.S. 2013, Da Responsabilidade Extracontratual, Cit., pp. 
444-464;  González  Campos,  J.  2002,  ‘Diversification,  spécialisation  et  matérialisation  des 
règles de droit international privé’,  RCADI, vol. 287, pp. 214-220, p. 259; Lagarde, P. 1986, 
‘Le principe de proximité en droit international privé contemporain’,  RCADI, vol. 196, pp. 
97 et seq.
36 It does not allow the application of the best law in a substantive point of view: v. Gonçalves, 
A.S.S. 2013, Da Responsabilidade Extracontratual, Cit., pp. 446-467; Lagarde, P. 1986, ‘Le prin-
cipe  de  proximité’,  Cit.,  pp.  122  et  seq;  Ramos,  R.M.  1995,  ‘Les  Clause  d´Exception  en 
Matière de Conflits de Lois et de Conflits de Juridiction – Portugal’ in Das Relações Privadas  
Internacionais, Estudos de Direito Internacional Privado, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, pp. 311-
312.
2014] A. Conçalves: The Rome II Regulation to Internet Torts 67
age and the law that has a closer connection according to the circumstances 
of the case. Thus, it requires a manifestly closer connection, which implies, 
in particular, a greater proximity with another law, compared with the one 
established on the other two connecting factors: habitual residence of the 
victim and the tortfeasor or the place of damage. However, in the hypo-
theses we are dealing with, it isn´t even possible to locate the damage, so 
there isn´t any way to make a comparison.
If it isn´t possible to apply the connections specified in Article 4, Sections 
1 and 2, because one cannot locate territorially the offense and, although the 
vocation of the exception clause is not to be primarily applicable, to pre-
serve the effectiveness of the rule, there is no reason not to do a direct ap-
plication of the manifestly closer connection, not as an escape clause but as 
a general clause. This has already been admitted by some authors, myself 
included, in those cases in which the offense occurs in areas without sover-
eignty: offenses or collisions on the high seas or in international airspace, 
where there is no common habitual residence of the parties and it is not 
possible to locate the damage in a legal system37. Aside from the argument 
of effectiveness of  Article  4,  the criterion of the closer connection is  also 
used by the ECJ on online delicts cases analyzed, when it tries to determine 
the jurisdiction. According to the ECJ, «(…) the identification of the place 
where the alleged damage occurred also depends on which court is best 
placed to determine whether the  alleged infringement is well founded»38. 
By transposing this argument to situations of choice- of-law, and consider-
ing the difficulty in locating the damage on online cross-border cases, the 
applicable law can be the one that is best placed (has the closer connection) 
to assess, not just the damage, but the infringement as a whole. The closer 
connection, underlying the principle of proximity, was also the justification 
of the center-of-interest criterion established in the eDate case: the proximity 
and the predictability for the parties that results from it. Of course we ar-
rived at this result trough a systematic and teleological interpretation, ac-
cording to the principle of proximity that inspires the rule: in these situ-
37 V. Gonçalves, A.S.S. 2013, Da Responsabilidade Extracontratual, Cit., pp. 462. Cfr., Brière, C.  
2008, ‘Le règlement (CE) n.º 864/2007 du 11 juillet 2007 sur la loi applicable aux obligations 
non  contractuelles  («Rome  II»)’,  Clunet,  no  1,  p.  55;  Calvo  Caravaca,  A.L.,  Carrascosa 
González, J. 2008, Las Obligaciones Extracontractuales en Derecho Internacional Privado, Editorial  
Comares, Granada, p. 129; Garcimartín Alférez, F., ‘Un apunte sobre la llamada “regla gener-
al” en el reglamento “Roma II”’, AEDIPr, vol. VII, p. 250.
38 Peter Pinckney, Cit., § 34. With the same reasoning: eDate Advertising and Olivier Martinez, 
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ations we change what was thought to be a mechanism of flexible approach 
of a rigid conflict-of-law rule (a traditional fast and hard rule), in the rule it -
self.
3. FINAL REMARKS
This study is an example of how the traditional conflict-of-law rules (as also 
the jurisdiction rules) that were constructed in a perspective of localization 
need some adaptation to be applicable to the Internet, because of its world-
wide reach. That happens in Article 4 of Rome II that was based on the prin-
ciple of lex loci delicti commissi. Yet, this adaptation has to be done according 
to another principle that inspired the Article: the principle of proximity and 
the need for flexibility in a case-by-case approach, according to the nature of 
the infringed right and their special scope of protection.
